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Mary Morgan’s new book on models in economics represents the 
culmination of more than a decade of research on the subject. She is 
certainly one of the most expert and accomplished researchers on the 
nature and role of models in economics, and this book provides an 
extensive review of the practice of modelling in economics across the 
history of the field. Her Models as Mediators, edited volume with 
Margaret Morrison (1999), is an influential collection of papers on how 
models function in modern science. So, readers in the history and 
philosophy of science interested in modelling in economics should find 
this book a valuable resource. Whether it answers their questions 
about models and resolves debates about the practice of modelling in 
economics is another issue. Morgan delimits some of those concerns in 
defining her project in a particular way. She speaks as an historian of 
economics first and foremost, and largely defers more weighty 
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philosophical questions to others. She has two main reasons for doing 
so. 
The first is methodological. In her estimation, adequate 
historical narrative is, as she puts it, ‘messy’. Historians often pursue 
linear accounts in the interest of providing a clear and cohesive 
understanding of their subject matter. But this comes at the expense 
of suppressing events and developments that do not fit their general 
story, and for Morgan, this undermines the integrity of that story. 
Important details are left out, and differences between cases get 
suppressed. Thus, The World in the Model is meant to be a 
heterogeneous collection of historical case studies each of which 
stands in its own right as an exercise in modelling in economics. “I 
have long described [the book] as a kind of travel guide: I present, as 
three-star tourist sites, some of the best known, and historically 
significant, models in economics, and use each as the basis upon 
which to fashion a philosophical commentary about the nature of 
modern economics” (xv). That philosophical commentary comes in the 
form of a collection of insights but not as a large philosophical 
argument about what models are. The book “does not try to give a 
definition of models—but it does discuss the qualities that make them 
useful in a science” (ibid.). 
The second reason Morgan puts history before philosophy is that 
her vision of her subject is of “a history of the naturalization of 
modelling in economics and a naturalized philosophy of science for 
economics” (ibid.). Thus, if The World in the Model does not offer a 
large philosophical argument about what models are, it certainly takes 
a distinct and strong philosophical position in regard to the 
interpretation of the history of economics as a science. Note that, as 
she puts it above, the history of economics with respect to modelling is 
itself a history of naturalizing its subject, with the outcome being a 
naturalized history. The tradition she sees herself contesting is that 
which emphasizes normative standards for good scientific explanation 
in economics and charts the history of economics in terms of progress 
in realizing those standards. Morgan’s view, in contrast, is that the 
history of economics has increasingly made the model a natural object 
in the sense of an historical product, so that we should only study 
models in a naturalized philosophy of science for economics. Her 
position, therefore, is not just that history is ‘messy’ and we risk 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Metascience, Vol. 23, No. 2 (July 2014): pg. 385-390. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer. 
3 
 
getting it wrong when we overlook its richness; it is that this history is 
becoming messier in and of itself, and this determines that we must 
study it with a naturalized philosophy of science. 
This outcome was not, however, an inevitable state of affairs. 
Modelling as a reasoning style in economics is a relatively recent 
historical development. Though there are precursors of models in the 
modern (1700 onward) history of economics—François Quesnay’s late 
1750s Tableau Économique is one of the earliest—economists only first 
referred to models in the 1930s and began then to make modelling 
their main method of investigation—with Jan Tinbergen (a physicist by 
training) transferring the term ‘model’ into the field from physics. In 
the earlier history, economics was a verbal science of broad 
generalizations, a few laws, and much reasoning about economic 
relationships. In contrast, the twentieth-century rise of modelling as a 
practice has been built around the construction and use of relatively 
small, compact mathematical objects subject to ready manipulation. 
Their ascendency displaced (or obscured) both verbal reasoning in 
economics and general principles and laws as the main object of 
scientific achievement. The lesser scale of models, their chameleon 
nature made possible by manipulation of their assumptions, and their 
mathematical form has left economics with a disparate set of 
conceptual episodes, much like different natural species, a conceptual 
space in which taxonomy takes precedence over philosophy. 
In this naturalized world, the main ‘philosophical’ questions have 
a pragmatic character: “How do economists create such research 
objects? What exactly is involved in scientific reasoning with such 
objects? How does working with such objects tell us anything about 
the world? That is: How should we characterize the making, using, and 
learning from models as a way of doing science?” (5). Wade Hands in 
his Reflection without Rules gives us a good sense of how questions of 
this kind have changed from the sorts of questions that philosophers 
and methodologists of economics previously asked. Traditionally, they 
engaged in a quite normative applied philosophy of science which 
borrowed and applied established arguments from natural science to 
economics—an “off-the-shelf view of scientific philosophy”. In its 
place, we find an inquiry without broad rules in which “our views about 
the epistemic order are … inexorably intertwined with our views about 
the economic order” (Hands 2001, 7). 
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In keeping with this, Morgan nonetheless makes important 
philosophical claims about what modelling involves. She takes 
modelling to be a distinct ‘epistemic genre’ or style of reasoning which 
has acquired its own specific form in economics, and uses the 
ambiguity of the term ‘formalization’ (a central concern in the 
development of postwar economics) to explain modelling as a two-
sided activity. One meaning of ‘to formalize’ is to give something form 
or shape. But ‘formal’ also contrasts with ‘informal’ and refers to 
something being rule bound. These two aspects of modelling thus 
correspond to two interconnected aspects of models, their making and 
their use, which constitute the two respective halves of the book. 
Thus: “models function both as objects to enquire into and as objects 
to enquire with. That is, they are objects for investigation in their own 
right, and they help the economist-scientist investigate the real-world 
economy” (31). 
This conception leads Morgan to one of her principal claims. 
Anticipating that some might say a dual view of models confuses our 
understanding of what models are, she gives a succinct 
characterization of the generic activity that model reasoning involves, 
at least in economics: using a model involves experiments. Models in 
themselves are not experiments but the use of them offers 
experiments: “model reasoning … involves a kind of experiment” 
(ibid.). More fully, modelling is a two-sided practice of systematically 
experimenting with ideas and their ultimate relevance. Consider 
models as objects to enquire into. Economists have a variety of 
theoretical ideas and conceptions, and they experimentally 
(imaginatively?) assemble them together in abbreviated and 
disciplined form in their models. But what the effects of these 
combinations or these experiments are only gets determined in their 
modelling. This reverberates back onto economists’ theoretical 
intuitions and leads to new models or experiments. The results can 
range from surprising to meaningless. So, overall model making is an 
activity, process, or practice that needs to be seen as ever ongoing. 
Consider models then as objects to enquire with. While scepticism 
about what models tell us about the real world is fair, compacting the 
‘world’ or the ‘person’ into a small conceptual space clearly offers 
opportunities for inferences about real people and the real world. At 
the same time, what we believe we find in the real world is surely 
influenced by the model ‘world’ we use as a means of investigation. 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Metascience, Vol. 23, No. 2 (July 2014): pg. 385-390. DOI. This article is © Springer and permission has been granted for 
this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Springer. 
5 
 
But how we justify scientific inference about the world is hardly a new 
problem, and while we may reach agreements about what makes for 
valid inference, agreements about particular inferences will always be 
subject to dispute. Thus, we can only continue to try to make 
inferences about what our models tell us, that is, continue to 
experiment with their fit. 
Morgan accordingly does not deny there are serious 
philosophical issues associated with how the ‘world in the model’ 
relates to the ‘model in the world’. She does say that modelling brings 
together two sides of one practice of investigation which as an ongoing 
activity is by nature experimental. Science never ends despite the fact 
that it has often been seen as a progressive series of outcomes. If we 
rather see it as open-ended process, we get a better idea of why 
models are two-sided experiments. 
This account of Morgan’s book, however, leaves unaddressed an 
important position she takes in regard to models in economics with 
respect to the meaning of formalization in economics. Among 
economists, formalization is more controversial than it might seem to 
non-economists. On the one hand, there is little reason to expect any 
less recourse to formal modelling and mathematical reasoning in the 
field or any significant return to the verbal forms of explanation that 
dominated the subject prior to 1950. On the other hand, economists 
also exhibit some ambivalence and uncertainty about what this 
transition in forms of reasoning involves, and whether it might leave 
economics less able to articulate its theoretical motivations and 
grounds for economic policy. 
Morgan’s intervention in this regard is to emphasize the story in 
the model. For her, narratives matter (217ff). This may sound quaint 
and old-fashioned, or somehow at cross-purposes to the impulse to 
formalization in economics, but it might also rather be seen as an 
important insight about the nature of modelling. After all, what drives 
the practice itself? Why do economists create models in the first place? 
Essentially, it is because they have questions about their theories and 
the world they want to answer, and the process of answering their 
questions and then asking new questions is intrinsic to creating and 
re-creating models. But nowhere in the mechanics of model making or 
model using does this vocabulary of asking and answering questions 
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appear. We take it for granted that this lies behind science. But 
Morgan sees it as only sensible that we bring what underlies modelling 
out into the light of day, otherwise we really fail to understand why 
economists model what they model. 
Note that there is a bit of a divide between philosophers of 
science/economics and methodologists of economics on this subject. 
The former look for the philosophy of science issues in economics and 
see economics as a means, just like other sciences, for getting at 
philosophical issues, which is the end. The latter rather look to 
philosophy as a means for getting at issues in economics, which is the 
end. That is, the two views are diametrically opposed with regard to 
order of importance and strategy of investigation. 
Morgan, then, comes down on the side of economic 
methodologists on this issue because she believes that you must know 
what questions bother economists—irrespective of whether those 
questions refer to or can be translated into fundamental questions of 
philosophy—if you are to understand economics. So her insistence that 
one must see the stories in the model and try to extract the stories 
economists are trying to tell represents a conviction about the nature 
of economic knowledge. This also underlies her commitment to a 
naturalized philosophy of science for economics. Naturalization in 
philosophy of science in its basic meaning is associated with the idea 
that the forms science takes are best explained naturalistically or as if 
they were altogether natural species. But naturalization for Hands 
(2001) in economics concerns the intertwining of the epistemic order 
and the economic order. The pursuit of economic knowledge flows 
from the problems of economics, however mundane or important they 
may be. Morgan delivers this message when she tells us narratives 
matter. 
The mechanics of the making and using of models in economics 
is therefore only the visible part of the practice of modelling. The 
overlooked part involves tacit understanding and offline talk by 
economists (McCloskey 1994) that frames their activities and output. 
Morgan demonstrates this admirably in her sixth chapter (“Questions 
and Stories: Capturing the Heart of Matters”) where she brings this 
conversation and story-telling to the surface in the history of 
macroeconomic theory. On the using side of models, she says: “‘How 
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do economists use models?’ is, in one sense, easy to answer: They ask 
questions with them and tell stories! Or more exactly: They ask 
questions, use the resources of the model to demonstrate something, 
and tell stories in the process” (217–218). 
But then this means that a popular reputation of economics—
that it has become a formalized science and that ordinary language is 
a thing of the past—is mistaken. Rather what has occurred is that the 
informal side of economics has become even more informal as 
conversation rather than text, while the formal side of economics has 
become even more formal in its increased scope as the exclusive text 
that economists employ. Yet both sides of science remain albeit in 
their changed forms. 
There are important scientific issues here that can be easy to 
miss. One is that the limitations of making inferences from models per 
se to the world are misconceived if the background narrative of 
questions and answers involved in their making and use is overlooked. 
How? If we have weak grounds for saying the model world taken on its 
own is sufficient for ‘addressing’ the real world, when we add an 
account of what questions the model was meant to answer, we 
generate further grounds for saying whether or not the model world is 
a credible or plausible means of ‘addressing’ the real world. I say 
‘addressing’ because the usual term ‘representing’ gets the relation 
between the model world and the real-world wrong. On Morgan’s view, 
models are created objects—or ‘working objects’ (Daston and Galison 
1992). They are things one does things with or instruments, not 
pictures or replicas of the real world. 
Another issue is the identity of science. With regard to 
economics, there has long been a distinction between the science of 
economics and the art of economics (Keynes 1891), where the latter 
was typically seen as a lesser, applied activity, value-laden and often 
idiosyncratic, and derivative of pure science. But this distinction, which 
arguably exists in other sciences as well, does not stand up well in the 
light of Morgan’s book. Indeed, she offers a significantly different and 
thoughtfully developed vision of science that merits reflection. This 
vision is cloaked in her demurrals about The World in the Model being 
essentially a history of a heterogeneous collection of case studies. But 
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those case studies tell a story which philosophers and historians of 
science and economics will find valuable and informative. 
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